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WHY PATENT EXHAUSTION SHOULD LIBERATE PRODUCTS

(AND NOT JUST PEOPLE)
SAMUEL F. ERNSTt
ABSTRACT

Patent exhaustion is a doctrine that excuses infringement where the
patent holder has either authorized the sale of a patented item or licensed
its use or sale. Absent an effective contractual restriction, the patent
holder's rights in the patented item are exhausted and the patent holder
cannot sue for infringement based on further use or resale of the item.
This Article explores the question of whether patent exhaustion adheres
in the patented device or if it is a defensive doctrine that only adheres to
the benefit of particular parties. Traditionally courts have articulated the
doctrine as liberating the accused product from patent rights, allowing it
to pass through the stream of commerce to subsequent users with all
rights exhausted. With respect to actual holdings, however, the Federal
Circuit recently concluded that exhaustion has only excused infringement
in the case law where the claim of infringement was against an "authorized acquirer" of the device, or against a party accused of inducing or
contributing to the infringement of such an authorized acquirer. Apparently a third party can be liable for infringement by unwittingly taking
action that facilitates the end user's use of the device for its intended
purpose, even if the device is licensed to perform that function.
This Article argues that the exhaustion doctrine should not be limited to shielding authorized acquirers of a patented device or any other
particular classes of persons. The Supreme Court has never pronounced
such a limitation on the doctrine. Rather, the Court has consistently characterized exhaustion as adhering in the patented device itself, allowing it
to pass unimpeded through the stream of commerce to be used for its
intended purpose.
A conception of patent exhaustion as adhering in the patented device is supported by all of the policy theories that have been used to justify the doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine has traditionally been justified
by (1) a policy to retain the balance between the need to encourage invention and the harm of a limited monopoly by ensuring that the inventor
does not receive double recovery for the value of the patented invention
and (2) the policy against restraints on alienation of servitudes. Recently
scholars have argued that the patent exhaustion doctrine serves a third
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purpose: to guard the domain of the federal patent law, such that it does
not interfere with the general commercial law of contracts. In fact, the
Supreme Court has long embraced all three theories as supporting patent
exhaustion.
Moreover, all three theories support a concept of patent exhaustion
as adhering in the patented device. If the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to police the domain of intellectual property statutes, such that
they do not interfere with commercial law, then the ability of patent
holders to police the use of downstream goods is properly limited by
contract law rules such as privity of contract and unconscionability. Patent rights must be exhausted to avoid interference with those laws. If the
exhaustion doctrine is justified by the related statutory domain policy
against overcompensation for patent holders for the use of their patented
inventions, then third parties should not be charged for interacting with
patented devices for which the patent holders have already received market-based compensation. If the exhaustion doctrine is justified by the
common law policy against restraints on alienation of chattels, then exhaustion adheres in the patented goods, such that they may move down
the stream of commerce unimpeded with restrictions on their lawful and
intended uses.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PatentedProducts in the Stream of Commerce
Consider the journey of a modem high technology product through
the stream of commerce. An automobile, smartphone, or a semiconductor
device is likely to practice the claims of thousands of patents., Patents on
the design, methods of manufacture, and individual aspects of each component of the product must be acquired, licensed, or ignored by the multiple companies that join together to make the new product. 2 Then there
are the hundreds of patents the product innovator never learns about, any
one of which can lead to a subsequent lawsuit, royalties, or a crippling
injunction. Mark Lemley writes that "[t]he prevalence of patents in these
industries has caused a number of people to worry about an 'anticommons' in patent law, in which companies that want to make a product
find it impossible to acquire all the rights they need from many different
owners."3
Now consider a situation in which all of these difficulties are overcome. The necessary patents are licensed to the manufacturers of the
high-tech product, in some cases, for inflated royalties in light of the
minor contribution that each individual patent makes to the larger product. 4 Next, the new product moves down the stream of commerce to distributors and end users. At this level, the new product can become ensnared in the patent thicket again as patent holders demand licenses from
or sue resellers, or even end users of accused products.5 "Customer
1. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 53-54 (2009) ("In industries such as semiconductors, by contrast, new products are so
complex that they can incorporate hundreds and even thousands of different inventions-inventions
frequently patented by different companies.").
2.
See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. STATE L. REV. 19, 19-20 (2008).
3.
See id. at 19 (first citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); and then citing Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 Sd. 698, 698-701 (1998); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967)); see also Amit Makker, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Commercialization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1175-76 (2011) ("Generally, a patent thicket will require an innovator to seek out and negotiate licenses with many patent holders in the field of endeavor to ensure that
the innovator will not be sued for patent infringement when building upon the work of others. Not
only could the licenses themselves be costly, the transaction costs associated with seeking out these
patent holders could also be large."); Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket. A Proposed
Patent Pooling Solution to the Nanotechnology "Building Block" Patent Thicket Problem, 4
DREXEL L. REv. 555, 562 (2012) ("The dense tangle of existing IP rights prevents downstream
entities from producing innovative technology because they cannot afford to license the litany of

'building block' patents necessary to provide protection from infringement litigation.").
4. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1991 (2007) ("Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a
minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin, including products sold by firms that
themselves have made substantial research and development investments.").
5.
See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law's Customer Suit Exception,
93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1606-15 (2013) (discussing the rise of patent law suits against resellers and
customers who did not make the accused product).
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suits," particularly those brought by non-practicing patent assertion entities, frequently garner settlements that reflect the high cost of defense
more than the low value of the patented invention, which is at best merely one small component of a much larger commercial product. 6 Customer
suits, moreover, result in needless judicial inefficiencies. Because the
accused resellers or customers did not make the accused product, extensive third party discovery, confidentiality disputes, motions practice, and
other difficulties are required to defend the litigation on its merits.7
Under the right circumstances, the patent exhaustion doctrine may
be able to prevent some of this needless tax on innovation caused by the
patent thicket. If the manufacturer at the top of the chain of production
takes a license to a patent portfolio, and the patent holder thereby authorizes the manufacture and sale of the device, then "[t]he longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item." 8 Hence, in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 9 the Supreme Court held that
when LGE granted Intel a license to make, use, and sell LGE's patented
microprocessors, LGE's rights in the licensed microprocessors were exhausted.' 0 LGE could not sue Intel's customer, Quanta, when Quanta
inserted the microprocessors into computers and thereby practiced LGE's
method claims. This is because "[t]he authorized sale of an article that
substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and
prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale
use of the article."'
B. The FederalCircuit'sNew "AuthorizedAcquirer" Restriction on
Patent Exhaustion
But what happens when we follow the licensed product down the
stream of commerce a little bit further? End users of a licensed automobile or smartphone cannot be sued for using the device for its intended
purpose as embodied in the licensed patents.12 But what about third parties who unwittingly broadcast content to the licensed car or smartphone,
or otherwise assist the end user in using the device for its intended purpose? If such conduct infringes the method claims of a patent licensed by
the manufacturer, does patent exhaustion shield the third party from
claims of patent infringement for practicing that method?
6.

Id at 1614.

7.
Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustionfor the Exhausted Defendant: Should PartiesBe Able
to ContractAround Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?,2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 445,

450 (2014).
8.
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625-26 (2008).
9.
553 U.S. 617 (2008).
10. Id at 637.
11.
Id. at 638.
12.
See id. ("The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the
patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use
of the article.").
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At first blush, one would think that patent exhaustion shields the
third party broadcaster from infringement liability. This is because the
authorized first sale of the device exhausts the patent rights in that device, and the patent holder cannot sail down the stream of commerce to
sue persons who subsequently use the device for its intended purpose.
The Supreme Court very early said, "[W]hen the machine passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.
It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of
Congress."l 3
Over the years, the Court has repeatedly articulated patent exhaustion as adhering in the patented device, shielding all subsequent users of
the device for its intended purpose from claims of infringement, absent
valid license restrictions. 14 The Court has said that when exhaustion occurs, the patent holder "ceases to have any interest whatever in the patented machine." 15 By parting title with the machine, the patent holder
"has placed the article beyond the limits of the monopoly secured by the
patent act."' 6 The Court's most recent pronouncements are in accord with
the older opinions in characterizing patent exhaustion as adhering in the
sold or licensed item. In 2008, the Court wrote that "[t]he longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."' And in 2013, the
Court held that patent exhaustion did not prevent a patent holder from
suing for infringement when a farmer made a new patented seed without
the patent holder's permission, because "the doctrine restricts a patentee's rights only as to the 'particular article' sold." 8 The Court has repeatedly and consistently characterized patent exhaustion as adhering in
licensed or sold items and not to protect particular classes of individuals.
However, in Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. New York Times
Co.,19 the Federal Circuit traced a new limit on the law of patent exhaustion, holding that patent exhaustion only protects "authorized acquirers"
of a sold device or parties who are accused of inducing or contributing to
the infringement of an authorized acquirer. 20 The court reviewed the exhaustion case law to conclude that "[t]he doctrine has never applied unless, at a minimum, the patentee's allegations of infringement, whether
direct or indirect, entail infringement of the asserted claims by authorized
acquirers-either because they are parties accused of infringement or

13.

Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).

14.
For an analysis of license restrictions that may be sufficient to "contract around" exhaustion, see Ernst, supra note 7, at 459-65.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895).
Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added).
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765-66 (2013).
778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Helferich II].
Id. at 1302.
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because they are the ones allegedly committing the direct infringement
,,21

To understand the scope of the Federal Circuit's new authorized acquirer restriction on patent exhaustion, it is necessary to delve briefly
into the details of the Helferich case. The plaintiff, Helferich, owns some
thirty U.S. patents related to wireless cell-phone technology, all of which
"derive from a common specification." 22 The Federal Circuit conceived
of the patents as containing two types of claims: (1) "handset claims,"
which relate to "wireless-communication devices" (e.g., smartphones)
and methods for such smartphones to receive and request information
over a wireless network; and (2) "content claims," which cover methods
of storing and updating information, and sending it to the smartphones
over a wireless network.23 The court assumed that the handset claims and
the content claims covered patentably distinct inventions because that
was the conclusion of the Patent and Trademark Office. 24 It is presumably the owner of the smartphone who may practice the handset claims,
by, for example, requesting content to be sent to the phone. And content
providers may practice the content claims, by, for example, sending content to the smartphone. In other words, the court proceeded on the premise, for lack of proof to the contrary, that content providers may practice
the content claims independently without the smartphone users performing any steps of those methods.25
Nonetheless, Helferich apparently licensed all of these thirty patents, including both types of claims "to what, at least at one time, constituted most-we may assume all-of the manufacturers of mobile handsets for sale in the United States."26 Hence, Helferich authorized cell
phone manufacturers to make and sell devices that could practice both
the handset claims and the content claims, free from claims of direct or
indirect infringement. And because this authorization exhausted Helferich's patent rights in the cell phones, purchasers of the smartphones are
immune from claims of patent infringement when they use the phones
for their intended purposes of requesting and receiving content over the
internet:
It is undisputed that, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, those licenses eliminate for the owners/possessors of handsets acquired from
the licensed manufacturers-"authorized acquirers"-any legal restriction the patents would otherwise impose on them through the pa21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1296.

25.
Id. at 1300 ("[D]efendants do not contend that handset possessors practice any of the
asserted [content] claims-that such handset users perform the steps of the claimed methods (even
any of the steps) or put into service and thereby use the claimed systems." (emphasis added)).

26.

Id. at 1296.
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tent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, regarding their sale or use of the
handsets. 27

In short, Helferich bargained for and received from cell phone makers market-determined compensation for the use of both its handset
claims and content claims. Helferich cannot pursue the cell phones down
the stream of commerce to collect double recovery from end users.
Presumably, however, the owners of the licensed smartphones
would like to use them to receive content and not only to request content.
But Helferich has followed the patented devices down the stream of
commerce to sue content providers, such as the New York Times and
CBS, for broadcasting content to the licensed devices in a way that may
practice the claims of the licensed patents. 28
The district court held that the content providers were shielded from
liability, quoting the Supreme Court for the rule that "[t]he longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item." 29 The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that patent exhaustion itself had been exhausted.30 It appears that once the patented item floats this far down the stream
of commerce, the exhausted patent rights can pull themselves out of the
drink and stand as a new dam against the intended use of the licensed
device.
To revive the patent rights, the Federal Circuit articulated a new
orientation for patent exhaustion. Exhaustion no longer terminates patent
rights in the licensed device itself. Instead, "[e]xhaustion protects an authorized acquirer'sfreedom from the legal restrictions imposed by the
patent statute." 31 The court reasoned that because the infringement statute defines infringement as an act committed by a person, patent exhaustion must also be limited to "remov[ing] those legal restrictions on certain persons." 32 The court found no actual language or holdings in Supreme Court precedent putting such a limit on patent exhaustion. But the

27.
28.
29.
976, 981
U.S. 617,
30.
31.

Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1295.
Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co. (Helferich 1), 965 F. Supp. 2d 971,
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553
625 (2008)), rev'd, 778 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1311.
Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).

32.
Id. ("Exhaustion protects an authorized acquirer's freedom from the legal restrictions
imposed by the patent statute. The statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from, e.g.,
making or using or selling a patented invention, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), and it then imposes concomitant legal restrictions on acts that violate the exclusivity right by defining, in closely related terms,
what it means for a person to 'infringe' the right, § 271. Patent exhaustion removes those legal
restrictions on certain persons in certain circumstances: it eliminates the legal restrictions on what
authorized acquirers 'can do with an article embodying or containing an invention' whose initial sale
(or comparable transfer) the patentee authorized." (quoting Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct.

1761, 1766 & n.2 (2013))).
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Federal Circuit's review of the precedent revealed that patent exhaustion
had not occurred in the case law
unless, at a minimum, the patentee's allegations of infringement,
whether direct or indirect, entail infringement of the asserted claims
by authorized acquirers-either because they are parties accused of
infringement or because they are the ones allegedly committing the
direct infringement required by the indirect infringement charged
against other parties. 33
Accordingly, the Helferich opinion reframes the orientation of exhaustion. Exhaustion does not liberate particular patented items from the
reach of the Patent Act; it liberates particular persons or classes of persons from claims of patent infringement.
The court in Helferich takes pains to point out the limitations of its
holding.34 The Helferich defendants were accused of infringing patent
claims that the customer did not necessarily practice in using the licensed
devices. 3 5 The Helferich defendants did not argue that they "use[d]" the
licensed devices by practicing the licensed patents.36 Nonetheless, the
asserted patent claims were claims under which the devices themselves
were licensed and for which license Helferich had already received compensation. 37 In other words, the devices were licensed to perform the
functions that formed the basis for the infringement accusations. The
only reason patent exhaustion did not preclude these claims of infringement was because of the Federal Circuit's new rule that exhaustion only
excuses infringement by authorized acquirers of a licensed device and
those who contribute to or induce such persons' infringement.3 8
And so, despite the limitations on the holding of the Helferich decision, the opinion represents a foundational shift in the orientation of patent exhaustion. Does patent exhaustion adhere in the patented device,
liberating that product and its intended uses from claims of patent infringement no matter who uses the product? Or does patent exhaustion
operate as a defense that only benefits particular classes of persons who
interact with the licensed device? Setting aside valid contractual restrictions, if a patent holder authorizes the sale of a patented device, are
the patent rights in the device exhausted as to all persons, or only as to
some particular class of persons? And what should the law be?

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id

at
at
at
at

1302.
1299-1301.
1300.
1299 ("And we will proceed on the premise, accepted by defendants, that only

handset owners/possessors, not those who practice the asserted content claims, 'use' the handsets.").
37.
Id. at 1296 ("Helferich licensed its portfolio to what, at least at one time, constituted
most-we may assume all-of the manufacturers of mobile handsets for sale in the United States.").
38.
Id. at 1301-02 ("Exhaustion protects an authorized acquirer's freedom from the legal
restrictions imposed by the patent statute.").
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Part II of this Article begins to explore these questions by first asking what, in fact, the Supreme Court has said on the matter. Part II closely examines Supreme Court precedent to conclude that the Court has
always framed patent exhaustion as adhering in the accused device, and
not as applying to protect particular persons from claims of infringement.
Where the Court has expressed policy in support of the doctrine, it is
policy focused on the incentive provided to the patent holder, the proper
scope of the Patent Act, and the alienability of goods in commerce-not
policy regarding which actors should be held liable for patent infringement. Once patent rights are exhausted in a product, that product is free
from claims of patent infringement, no matter who is the defendant.39
Part III of the Article asks whether patent exhaustion should adhere
in the licensed or sold article, or if the Federal Circuit panel was correct
to limit the defense to particular classes of defendants. Which is the better policy? Part III begins by examining Supreme Court precedent to
determine what policies the Court has articulated in support of the exhaustion doctrine. Traditionally, commentators have grounded patent
exhaustion in one of two theories. First, patent exhaustion prevents overcompensation for the patent holder for the use of its patented product,
which is necessary to preserve the balance the patent laws must strike
between the incentive to invent and the freedom required for innovation,
industry, and a free market. 0 Second, patent exhaustion prevents the
Patent Act from interfering with the common law's policy of abhorring
servitudes running with personal property. 4' Recently, scholars have
opined that patent exhaustion is justified by the need to define the domain of the Patent Act, such that it does not interfere with general commercial law.42 Once all patent rights in a particular product have been
exhausted, the law of contracts, property, and commercial law govern the
use of the property in commerce.43 Part III demonstrates that, in fact, the
Supreme Court has relied on all three theories in support of the exhaustion doctrine since the nineteenth century. The Court has sought to enforce all three policies in its exercise of the exhaustion doctrine and,
therefore, all three policies must be considered in determining whether
exhaustion should adhere in the patented device or only as to particular
classes of persons. Accordingly, Part III argues that all three policy justifications for the exhaustion doctrine support a conception of patent exhaustion as adhering in the sold or licensed device.
First, the best way to ensure that the patent holder does not receive
double compensation for the use of its patented device is by exhausting
39.

See infra Part II.

40.
41.

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.

42.

See generally John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial

Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV., Mar. 2016, at 1, 1-2, 7-8.
43. See infra Section III.C.
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all rights in the device, not only as to particular users. If the first sale or
license of a device only triggers patent exhaustion as to particular parties,
then it allows the patent holder to receive full compensation for the use
of a patented device and then receive additional compensation for that
use from third parties who facilitate the use.44
Second, further patent-right interference with an item after it is sold
or licensed under a patent allows the Patent Act to exceed its statutory
domain and invade the province of general contract, commercial, and
property law, which should now govern the use of the item in a free market. These areas of law reflect policies, such as consumer protection and
freedom of contract, with which the federal law should not interfere.45

Third, among those common law policies the exhaustion doctrine is
meant to shield from the Patent Act is the policy against restraints on
alienation of personal property. Patent exhaustion must adhere in the
patented goods, rather than with respect to particular persons, to prevent
annoyance and inefficiencies as goods pass through commerce, such that
"competition, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of
the consumer."
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REVEALS THAT EXHAUSTION ADHERES
IN PRODUCTS AND NOT AS TO PARTICULAR PERSONS

The Federal Circuit in Helferich reviewed some of the Supreme
Court opinions on exhaustion and noted a common feature in the fact

patterns: the doctrine had, thus far, always been applied to shield from
infringement liability either persons who had acquired the accused device or persons who were accused of inducing or contributing to the infringement of such authorized acquirers.47 Thus far, according to the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court's cases had not excused infringement
under the exhaustion doctrine by persons who did not cause authorized
acquirers to infringe, but who practiced other patent claims under which
the devices were also licensed.
The Federal Circuit's reasoning in Helferich consists of turning this
coincidence in the fact patterns into a rule: "Exhaustion [only] protects
an authorized acquirer'sfreedom from the legal restrictions imposed by
the patent statute." 48 The court announced a new limit on exhaustion that
focuses on the identity of the accused defendant rather than on the patent

holder's relationship to the patented article.

44.
45.
46.

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.C.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013); see also infra Sec-

tion III.B.

47.
48.

Helferich II, 778 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
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But what do the Supreme Court cases actually say? Has this feature
of the fact patterns been the basis for the Court's decision in any case
finding exhaustion? Close scrutiny of each Supreme Court case on exhaustion reveals that the Court has never suggested any restriction on
patent exhaustion based on the identity of the accused defendant. Rather,
the Court has consistently conceived of exhaustion as adhering in the
patented article. This Part provides a close analysis of Supreme Court
precedent to conclude that the Court determines exhaustion based solely
on an assessment of the patent holder's relationship to the patented item.
If the patent holder has relinquished all rights in the patented item, he has
"exhaust[ed] the monopoly in that article" and "has thus parted with his
right to assert the patent monopoly with respect to it."49
The Federal Circuit justifies its reorientation of the exhaustion doctrine in Helferich by referring to the provision in the Patent Act that defines infringement:
The statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from, e.g.,
making or using or selling a patented invention, 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(1), and it then imposes concomitant legal restrictions on acts
that violate the exclusivity right by defining, in closely related terms,
what it means for a person to "infringe" the right, § 271. Patent exhaustion removes those legal restrictions on certain persons in certain
circumstances .... 50
It is true that Section 271 of the Patent Act defines infringement as
particular actions that violate the exclusionary right-for example, the
unauthorized "mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing]" of a patented invention.5 ' But it does not therefore follow that "[p]atent exhaustion removes those legal restrictions on certain persons in certain circum,,52
stances.
The Patent Act also defines the patent holder's "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention."5 And in addressing exhaustion, the Supreme Court has focused on
the patent holder's relationship to this exclusionary right and whether or
not she has exhausted it with respect to particular goods. The identity of
the accused user of the patented device is not relevant to determining
whether there are any patent rights remaining in the device.
The Court established this conception of exhaustion adhering in the
patented device as early as 1852. In the case of Bloomer v. McQuewan,54
the defendant purchased the right to construct and use patented planing

49.
50.
51.
§ 271(a)
52.
53.
54.

United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942).
Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1301.
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (PATENT Act), 35 U.S.C.
(2012).
Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1301.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
55 U.S. 539 (1852).
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machines during the term of the patent. 5 The question for the Court was
whether the patent holder could sue for infringement based on use of the
machines during an extension of the patent term.56 The Court concluded
that there was no cause of action for infringement because the patent
holder, by authorizing the manufacture of the patented machine, had exhausted his patent rights in that particularmachine: "And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the
protection of the act of Congress." 57 It is the patent rights in the device
that are exhausted, not the right to enforce those rights against particular
persons.
In fact, particular persons may still be liable under causes of action
other than for patent infringement, because by sending the sold device
outside the domain of the Patent Act, the Court allows the general commercial law to govern use of the device: "[I]f [the patent holder's] right
to the implement or machine is infringed, he must seek redress in the
courts of the State, according to the laws of the State, and not in the
courts of the United States, nor under the law of Congress granting the
patent.",5 Patent exhaustion adhered in the patented planing machine; the
question of who could interact with the machine subsequent to patent
exhaustion was properly governed solely by the state law of personal
property and contracts.
Indeed, every single Supreme Court case on patent exhaustion that
this author has reviewed conceptualizes patent exhaustion as adhering in
the sold or licensed device and not as to particular parties.
In Mitchell v. Hawley59 the patent holder avoided patent exhaustion
by placing valid contractual restrictions on the use of its machines. 0 But
contractual restrictions aside, in describing the operation of the exhaustion doctrine, the Court plainly considered it a question of whether exhaustion had adhered in the patented device, and not as to particular persons:
[W]hen [the patent holder] has himself constructed a machine and
sold it without any conditions, or authorized another to construct,
sell, and deliver it, or to construct and use and operate it, without any
conditions, and the consideration has been paid to him for the thing
patented, the rule is well established that the patentee must be understood to have parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 549-50.
83 U.S. 544 (1872).

60.
Id. at 550. The Court's treatment of attempts to contract around exhaustion are not the
topic of this Article. For a full analysis of this question, see Ernst, supra note 7, at 451-59.
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that he ceases to have any interest whatever in the patented machine
so sold and delivered or authorized to be constructed and operated. 61
Absent an effective contractual provision, patent exhaustion acts to
drain all patent rights out of a sold or licensed device. The identity of any
particular person accused of infringement by using that device does not
enter into consideration. This is because the patent holder "ceases to have
any interest whatever in the patented machine." 62 The machine has
passed outside of the patent monopoly.
In Adams v. Burke,63 the plaintiff exhausted his rights in patented
coffin lids by licensing a third party to make and sell the lids for use
within a ten-mile radius of Boston. 4 The patent holder could not sue the
defendant for patent infringement when he purchased the lids and interred them in Natick, Massachusetts, seventeen miles outside of Boston. 65 This had nothing to do with whether the defendant was an authorized acquirer of the lids. There was no suit for infringement because the
coffin lids had "passe[d] without the limit of the monopoly." 66 The Court
held that after the coffin lid was sold, "so far as the use of it was concerned, the patentee had received his consideration, and it was no longer
within the monopoly of the patent." 67 Patent exhaustion again liberated
the device from patent rights, not particular classes of persons.
The Court again articulated exhaustion as adhering in the patented
device in Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co. 68 There, the defendant
purchased patented beds from a Michigan licensee under the patent and
resold them in Massachusetts. The Court held that patent exhaustion prohibited the Massachusetts licensee under the patent from suing for infringement based on the resale of the beds.69 The case did not turn on
whether the defendant was an authorized acquirer of the beds, however.
Rather, the sale of the beds to the defendant exhausted all patent rights in
those beds: "[T]he purchase of the article from one authorized by the
patentee to sell it, emancipates such article from any further subjection
to the patent throughout the entire life of the patent . . . .
It does not
matter who is accused of committing patent infringement with respect to
the article; the article is emancipated from any further subjection to the
patent.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Mitchell, 83 U.S. at 547.
Id. (emphasis added).
84 U.S. 453 (1873).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 454-56.
Id at 456.
Id.
157 U.S. 659, 663-66 (1895).
Id. at 666.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Because exhaustion adheres in the patented device, rather than operating as a defense reserved for particular defendants, the Court early on
decided that post-sale restrictions are ineffective to prevent patent exhaustion. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,71 the plaintiff held a patent on film projectors and granted a li72
cense to a third party to manufacture and sell the projectors. The license
agreement contained a clause purporting to place restrictions on the use
of the devices after they were sold-a "post-sale restriction." Specifically, the license provided that the machines were to be sold "under the restriction and condition that such exhibiting or projecting machine shall
be used solely for exhibiting or projecting motion pictures containing the
inventions of reissued letters patent No. 12,192, [another patent owned
by the plaintiff] . . . . When Universal Film supplied to the purchaser
of the patented projector with films that were not covered by that patent,
Motion Picture Patents Company sued for infringement. 4
The Court ruled that the post-sale restriction could not prevent patent exhaustion because it purported to exercise the patent monopoly
over devices that had left the domain of the Patent Act. "[T]he right to
vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being
thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free
of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it."75 It did
not matter that Universal Film was accused of contributing to the infringement of an authorized acquirer of the machines. All that mattered
was the patent holder's relation to the machines; the patent holder had
exhausted all patent rights in the machines as to all uses of the device by
76
anyone.
When the Court reaffirmed the ineffectiveness of post-sale restrictions to avoid exhaustion in Quanta, it relied on the same logic: postsale restrictions fail to prevent patent exhaustion because the device has
already been carried outside of the patent monopoly. In Quanta, the
Court held that LGE's patents on the methods of operation of its circuits
were exhausted when it authorized Intel to make circuits that substantially embodied the claimed methods.77 LGE could not sue Quanta for infringing its method patents when Quanta purchased the circuits from
Intel and put them to their intended use because "patent exhaustion pro71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

243 U.S. 502 (1917).
Id at 505-06.
Id. at 506.
Id at 507-08.
Id. at 516.

76.
In arriving at this decision, the Court overruled its opinion in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1 (1912), which held that post-sale restrictions could prevent patent exhaustion. Id. at 518.
Notably, in committing this legal error, the Henry opinion misstated patent exhaustion as protecting
the rights of purchasers of the device, rather than as relating to the exhaustion of patent rights in the
device. 224 U.S. at 19 ("By a sale of a patented article subject to no conditions, the purchaser undeniably acquires the right to use the article for all the purposes of the patent, so long as it endures.").

77.

Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
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vides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."7 8 LGE argued that patent exhaustion was avoided by a post-sale restriction in one of its agreements with Intel providing
that no license was granted to any third party, such as Quanta, to use the
patented circuits in combination with non-Intel parts. 79 The Court rejected this argument on the basis that LGE could not assert patent rights over
an item in which all patent rights were exhausted. "[T]he question
whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because
Quanta asserts its right to practice the patents based not on implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on Intel's own license to sell products practicing the LGE Patents."80 In other words, exhaustion does not turn on the identity of accused infringers. Rather, exhaustion turns only on the question of whether the patent holder has disposed of its patent rights in a particular item. "The authorized sale of an
article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's.
rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control
postsale use of the article."81 Patent exhaustion adheres in the sold or
licensed article, and not as to particular parties who later interact with the
article.
The Supreme Court's steadfast adherence to the principle that patent
exhaustion adheres in the patented article has also redounded to the benefit of the patentee. In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 82 the question was
whether the patent holder, Monsanto, could sue a farmer who used patented soybeans not only to grow soybean crops, as was permitted, but
83
also to create new soybeans for replanting the following season. The
Court held that patent exhaustion did not shield the farmer from infringement liability because the sale of a patented article "does not allow
the purchaser to make new copies of the patented invention."8 This is
because "[tjhe doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee's right to
control what others can do with an article embodying or containing an
invention." 85 Because patent exhaustion adheres in a licensed or sold
item, and not as to particular persons, "the doctrine restricts a patentee's
rights only as to the 'particular article' sold it leaves untouched the patentee's ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item." 86 Hence, the Bowman Court is consistent with all of the other
Supreme Court precedent finding that patent exhaustion removes the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 625, 638.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638.
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
Id. at 1764.
Id.
Id. at 1766 (emphasis added).

86.

Id. (citation omitted).
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licensed or sold article from the patent monopoly; it does not act merely
to shield particular persons from infringement liability.
Indeed, every Supreme Court opinion this author has identifiedtoo many to describe in detail here-frames the exhaustion doctrine in
this way.8 The Court explains the operation of patent exhaustion in exceptionally clear terms in United States v. Univis Lens Co.88 :
The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his
patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying the invention.
His monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership of the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and
the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the
89
use or disposition of the article.
Hence, the Supreme Court has always conceived of patent exhaustion as adhering in the article sold or licensed by the patent holder. Exhaustion removes the sold article from the patent monopoly and the patent holder cannot sue anyone for patent infringement based on an interaction with that article.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's decision in Helferich, announcing that patent exhaustion only adheres to the benefit of a particular class
of persons, is a new limit on patent exhaustion. The Federal Circuit may
be correct that the Supreme Court has never decided a case in which the
party obtaining protection from the exhaustion doctrine was neither an
authorized acquirer of the patented device or someone who induced or
contributed to an authorized acquirer's infringement. 90 But this has never
been the basis for the Supreme Court's decisions finding patent exhaustion. The question has, rather, always turned on the extent to which the
patent holder has parted with her rights in the patented article. Absent an
effective contractual restriction to prevent exhaustion, once patent exhaustion occurs, it occurs in the patented item, allowing for its intended
use free from restriction by the Patent Act. Under this conception of patent exhaustion, one would assume the doctrine would shield third parties
from claims of infringement as well-parties such as content providers to
a licensed device, who interact with the device using a method the device
87.

See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457 (1940) ("And by the

authorized sales of the fuel by refiners to jobbers the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and after
the sale neither appellant nor the refiners may longer rely on the patents to exercise any control over

the price at which the fuel may be resold."); Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8,
25 (1918) ("[O]ne who had sold a patented machine and received the price and had thus placed the
machine so sold beyond the confines of the patent law, could not by qualifying restrictions as to use
keep under the patent monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no longer applied."); Bauer & Cie

v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913) ("[T]his court from the beginning has held that a patentee who
has parted with a patented machine by passing title to a purchaser has placed the article beyond the
limits of the monopoly secured by the patent act.").

88.
89.
90.

316 U.S. 241 (1942).
Id. at 250.
Helferich II, 778 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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is licensed to perform. The Federal Circuit's pronouncement to the contrary is new law, even taking into account the many limitations on the
court's holding.91
III. ALL THREE THEORIES OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
ARTICULATED BY CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS SUPPORT EXHAUSTION
ADHERING IN THE PATENTED DEVICE, AND NOT AS TO PARTICULAR

PERSONS
Given that the Supreme Court has never imposed an authorized acquirer restriction on the patent exhaustion doctrine, and given that the
restriction was only imposed by a panel of the Federal Circuit, it is fair
game to inquire into whether such a limitation is good policy. Should
patent exhaustion only apply to protect from infringement liability "authorized acquirers" of the accused device or those who induce or contribute to their infringement? Or, should patent exhaustion adhere in the
licensed or sold product, freeing it from claims of infringement against
all parties who come to interact with that product?
Answering these question requires consideration of the three major
policy arguments that have been advanced in favor of the patent exhaustion doctrine. Scholars have long theorized that exhaustion is justified
either by a policy to prevent patent holders from obtaining overcompensation for the value of their patented inventions, the policy against "double-recovery," or by the common law policy against servitudes running
with personal property. 92 Recently, scholars have posited a third justification for patent exhaustion: the exhaustion doctrine serves to police the
domain of intellectual property law, such that it does not displace the
general commercial law of contracts, property, and antitrust (hereafter,
"the domain theory" of patent exhaustion). 93
Adherents to the domain theory of patent exhaustion have suggested
that it has been the only theory animating the Supreme Court in applying
the exhaustion doctrine. 9 4 Professors John F. Duffy and Richard Hynes
have argued that "[t]he legal doctrine in the area pursues not common
law policies disfavoring encumbrances or restraints on alienation, but
instead the more nuanced goal of limiting the scope or domain of IP statutes to avoid displacing the law in other fields, such as general contract,
property, and antitrust law." 95
In fact, as explained in this Section, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked all three policy justifications for patent exhaustion in developing the doctrine. The Supreme Court has at times grounded patent
91.

See id. at 1299-1301.

92.
93.

See Ernst, supra note 7, at 465-75.
See Duffy & Hynes, supra note 42, at 1-2, 7.

94.
95.

See id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
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exhaustion in a policy to ensure that the patent holder receives no more
compensation for the value of her patented invention than is commensurate with the scope of the invention and as is necessary to encourage innovation. 96 The Supreme Court has also repeatedly justified the exhaustion doctrine in the common law policy against servitudes running with
personal property. 97 And the Court has often emphasized the need to
police the boundaries of the Patent Act, such that it does not interfere
with general commercial law. 98 These policies are not incompatible with
one another; in fact, they are complementary policies. As argued below,
all three policies favor, even require, that patent exhaustion adhere in the
patented device and not only as to particular parties.
A. The Policy Against Double Recovery Supports Exhaustion Adhering
in the PatentedDevice
The policy against double recovery proceeds on the premise that
"[t]he patent holder should be rewarded for [her] original contribution to
the art with a [reward] that is commensurate with the [value] of [the]
invention as determined by the free market," and no more than is necessary to spur innovation." The Supreme Court has invoked this policy in
justifying patent exhaustion because patent exhaustion ensures that the
patent holder does not charge duplicative royalties on a device from multiple parties as the device passes through the stream of commerce.
Hence, for example, in Motion Picture Patents Co., the Court invoked exhaustion with the remonstrance that "this court has consistently
held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of
private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is 'to promote the progress
of science and the [sic] useful arts.'" 100 Accordingly, the inventor should
receive a royalty for his invention that is determined by the value of the
invention on the free market:
If his discovery is an important one, his reward under such a construction of the law will be large, as experience has abundantly
proved; and if it be unimportant, he should not be permitted by legal
devices to impose an unjust charge upon the public in return for the
use of it. 101

The exhaustion doctrine serves as a check on such "legal devices,"
such as the post-sale restriction at issue in the Motion Picture Patents
Co. case, ensuring that the patent holder does not receive overcompensation for the patented invention. Patent exhaustion asks if there has been
96.

See infra Section III.A.

97.
98.

See infra Section III.B.
See infro Section III.C.

99.

See Ernst, supra note 7, at 465.

100.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
101. Id.at513.
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an authorized first sale because "[t]he test has been whether or not there
has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the
patentee has received his reward for the use of the article."' 02
The Court has invoked the policy against double recovery in patent
exhaustion opinions going back to the very beginning of the doctrine. In
Mitchell the Court wrote that patent holders
are never entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and consequently a patentee, when he has himself constructed a machine and
sold it without any conditions, . . . and the consideration has been
paid to him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the
patentee must be understood to have parted to that extent with all his
exclusive right .... 103
The Court relied on the policy against double recovery in Adams as
well, writing that patent exhaustion occurs because "the patentee or his
assignee ha[s] in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration
which he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or
instrument."1 04 In Univis Lens Co., the Court explained that patent exhaustion applies because, in selling the patented device, the patent holder
"has received in the purchase price every benefit of that monopoly which
the patent law secures to him."105 Exhaustion ensures that the patent
holder receives no additional reward, which would improperly "extend
his monopoly."'a Hence, the policy against double recovery has been
consistently articulated by the Supreme Court as a policy that animates
patent exhaustion.
Scholars have debated whether patent exhaustion is necessary to
prevent double recovery. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp describes an
argument made by the "Chicago school writers" that "in any multi-stage
distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be earned." 07
Hence, according to these scholars, patent holders will be prevented from
charging duplicative or excessive royalties at multiple stages as a product
passes through the stream of commerce because the price of the patented
product will be too high, and sales will be lost. 08
Other scholars have countered these arguments by pointing out that
the market can fail to check double recovery in a world without patent
exhaustion because purchasers of patented products may have insuffi-

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1872).
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873).
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942).
Id.

107.

Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doc-

trine in Perspective,66 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 487, 514-15 (2011).
108. Id. at 515.

918

DENVER LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 93.4

cient notice of the patent rights that encumber their purchase.'0 For example, a consumer may pay a market-determined price for a cell phone
with the expectation that it is licensed to perform its intended core function of requesting and receiving content from content providers. Indeed,
in the Helferich opinion itself, Helferich had obtained a royalty from cell
phone manufacturers for all of its patents: compensation for the handset
claims practiced by consumers and compensation for the content claims
practiced by content providers."i 0 The market had determined a price for
that intellectual property and this price had presumably been passed
through to the consumer. But if patent holders can then charge an additional royalty to those very content providers for interacting with the
device in this way, this royalty will also presumably be passed through to
consumers in the higher expense of obtaining content for devices. This
royalty has not been checked by the market price of the device because
the consumer has had no notice of it.' The device is now charged with
the same royalty to the same intellectual property twice... unless the
patent exhaustion doctrine solves the problem.
Hence, the policy against double recovery calls for a vigorous patent exhaustion doctrine to prevent supra-market compensation to the
patent holder for the value of the patented invention. It is essential to the
operation of the policy against double recovery that patent exhaustion
adhere in the patented device and not only to protect particular defendants. This is because the doctrine prevents overcompensation that occurs
when a patent holder charges a royalty on the same device for the same
intellectual property as it passes through the stream of commerce. In the
scenario described above, because the Federal Circuit decided in Helferich that patent exhaustion only excuses infringement by authorized acquirers,"l 2 the patent holder was able to charge two royalties for the same
intellectual property in the reception of content for mobile devices: one
royalty to handset manufacturers and an additional royalty to content
providers.
As properly framed, the exhaustion doctrine would prevent this
double recovery because it operates on the patented device. Hence, as the
Supreme Court stated in Univis Lens Co.:
[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his reward for the use of

109.

Ernst, supra note 7, at 471-72.

110.

Helferich II, 778 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Helferich licensed its portfolio to

what, at least at one time, constituted most-we may assume all-of the manufacturers of mobile
handsets for sale in the United States.").
Ill.
For a discussion of the difficulties with notice in intellectual property regimes, see Mark
R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts?Consent and Notice in IntellectualProperty, 40 FLA. ST.

U. L. REV. 105, 149 (2012). See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO.
L.J. 885, 935 (2008).
112. Helferich II, 778 F.3d at 1301.
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his invention by the sale of the article, and that once that purpose is
realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.' 13
The only way to ensure that multiple royalties are not charged for
the same intellectual property is for patent exhaustion to adhere in the
patented device and not as to particular classes of individuals.
B. The Policy Against Servitudes Supports Exhaustion Adhering in the
PatentedDevice
An additional, related policy supporting patent exhaustion is the
traditional common law policy against servitudes running with personal
property. This policy holds that goods should pass through commerce
unencumbered by retained rights, easements, and servitudes that restrict
and tax further alienation and result in unnecessary notice and research.
costs.114 Patent exhaustion prevents servitudes in the form of retained

patent rights by exhausting all patent rights in an article that is sold or
licensed under the patent. 15
The Supreme Court has consistently invoked the policy against personal property servitudes to support its decisions applying patent exhaustion. In Motion PicturePatents Co. the Court found that the patent holder
had exhausted all rights in its patented film projectors because it could
not be allowed "to send its machines forth into the channels of trade of
the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be
imposed thereafter at the discretion of such patent owner." 116 All rights.
were exhausted by the sale of the projectors because "[t]he patent law
furnishes no warrant for such a practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and
annoyance to the public which the opposite conclusion would occasion
forbid it."11 7
The Court was similarly animated by its abhorrence of personal
property servitudes in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. 1 '8 The Court
held that the patent holder's post-sale restriction attached to its patented
phonographs providing that they could only be used with the patent
holder's products was insufficient to prevent patent exhaustion.1 19 The
Court's reasoning was based almost entirely in the common law policy
against servitudes:
Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such
an attempt as this "License Notice" thus plainly is to sell property for
113.

United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) (emphasis added).

114.

Ernst, supra note 7, at 473-75.
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117.
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Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Films Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
Id.
243 U.S. 490 (1917).
Id. at 500-01.
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a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation,
such as have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke's day to ours,
because obnoxious to the public interest. 120

The Court enforced this policy by holding that all patent rights in
the patented projectors were exhausted "after the plaintiff had been paid
for them." 12 1
Indeed, even in these modem times, courts cite to the policy against

personal property servitudes in justifying exhaustion. The Supreme Court
recently relied upon the policy in Kirtsaengv. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.1 22

in holding that the authorized reproduction of a copyrighted book overseas exhausts all rights in that copy.123 The Court stated that its holding
was supported by "the common law's refusal to permit restraints on the

alienation of chattels." 124 The Federal Circuit recently extended this policy to the realm of patent exhaustion in holding that giving away a patented product for no consideration triggers patent exhaustion. 125 The court
discussed the Supreme Court's reliance on the policy against personal
property servitudes and then stated that, absent patent exhaustion, "consumers' reasonable expectations regarding their private property would

be significantly eroded."

26

Hence, the common law policy against servitudes running with personal property is a major policy animating the exhaustion doctrine. Professor Hovenkamp has observed that in antitrust opinions, the Supreme
Court has rejected reliance on the policy against servitudes because it
"reflected ""formalistic line drawing' rather than 'demonstrable economic effect."'127 However, in the realm of intellectual property, the policy against servitudes continues to have significant justifications. Profes-

sor Molly Shaffer Van Houweling has identified three ways in which
personal property servitudes are harmful even in the absence of the anticompetitive effects that are the target of the antitrust laws.
First, personal property servitudes impose notice and information
costs on patented goods as they pass through commerce.128 At every
stage, persons who acquire or interact with the patented device must either expend resources to determine what patent restrictions remain in the
device or be subject to infringement liability. For example, under the rule

of the Helferich opinion, content providers seeking to transmit content to
a device owned by an end user must investigate whether the device re120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 501.

122.
123.

133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
Id. at 1363.

124.
125.
126.

Id.
LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1377.

127.
128.

Hovenkamp, supra note 107, at 506.
Van Houweling, supra note I11, at 932-39.
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tains patent restrictions to prevent such broadcasting, even though the
device has been the subject of a first sale.1 2 9
Second, personal property servitudes may result in "underuse or inefficient use of the resources subject to the restriction."1 30 For example, if
content providers must pay an additional royalty to patent holders for
broadcasting content to devices that are already fully licensed under the
patents, it may result in less content being broadcasted or content being
broadcasted at a higher price.
Third, personal property servitudes can "waive public-regarding
limitations built into intellectual property law." 131 By defining the exclusive right and the patent term, Congress has struck a balance between
encouraging innovation and allowing the public to incur the harm of a
limited monopoly. Once the patent holder receives its market-determined
compensation for the invention, allowing the patent holder to use contractual devices to obtain additional compensation from subsequent parties thwarts this balance. 132 This justification for the policy against servitudes intersects that theory with the theory against double recovery and
the domain theory described below.
Hence, the common law policy against servitudes running with personal property is a policy that animates patent exhaustion, both in Supreme Court precedent and among scholars. Plainly, this policy requires
that patent exhaustion adhere in the patented article that has been sold or
licensed and not as to particular persons. The policy requires that once an
article has been sold for full price, there can be no further restraints upon
its use and alienation.' 33 Further patent restraints on the use or resale of
the device result in "inconvenience and annoyance to the public." 34 For
example, once a cell phone is sold for full compensation and licensed
under patents related to its core function of receiving content, further
patent-based restraints on the device's ability to receive content from
particular providers represents a servitude running with personal property
in violation of the common law policy against such servitudes. Full effectuation of the policy against servitudes requires that the sold or licensed item be free from claims of infringement as to all parties that
come to interact with the device.

129.

See Helferich 11, 778 F.3d 1293, 1301-03 (Fed Cir. 2015) (holding that the authorized first

sale of cell phones did not exhaust claims against content providers on the basis that they were not
"authorized acquirers" of the device).
130.
Van Houweling, supra note 111, at 939.

131.
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133.
134.

Id. at 946.
Id. at 939.
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917).
Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 667 (1895).
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C. The Domain Theory Supports PatentExhaustion Adhering in the PatentedDevice
The third policy supporting the exhaustion doctrine that scholars
have recently written about is what may be called domain theory. Under
this theory, patent exhaustion serves to limit the scope of the Patent Act
so that it does not interfere with generally applicable commercial law,
specifically contract law and antitrust law.1 35 Patent rights are exhausted
to allow the contract law policies related to such things as privity of contract and unconscionability to be enforced. Patent rights are exhausted to
prevent the Patent Act from interfering with antitrust law's maintenance
of free competition.
The domain theory of patent exhaustion, like the other two theories
discussed above, has long been a theme relied upon by the Supreme
Court in finding patent exhaustion. The Court found patent exhaustion in
Bloomer because after the sale of a patented machine, the machine was
"not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the
State in which it is situated. Contracts in relation to it are regulated by
the laws of the State, and are subject to State jurisdiction."' 36 Hence, if
there were any restriction on the ability of the owners of the machines to
use the machines for their intended purpose, such restrictions would have
to be consistent with the law of contracts.
The Court used patent exhaustion to police the domain of the Patent
Act again in Keeler. In finding that there was no cause of action for infringement based on the resale of beds in Massachusetts that had been
lawfully purchased in Michigan, the Court made clear that it was avoiding treading into the territory of contract law:
Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us,
and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one
under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.1 37
The law of contracts would likely not have provided a remedy for
the plaintiff in Keeler either, because the defendant was not a party to the
contract prohibiting the sale of the beds in Massachusetts.' 38 In this way,
the Court's use of patent exhaustion to place a limitation on the domain
of the Patent Act prevents the federal law from interfering with the
common law policies surrounding privity of contract.
The current Supreme Court is similarly conscious of the need to apply patent exhaustion in a way that permits the policies of contract law to
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be effected free from the interference of the Patent Act. In Quanta, the
Court took pains to note that its ruling that patent exhaustion precluded a
claim for infringement "does not necessarily limit LGE's other contract
rights. LGE's complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and
we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available
even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages."l 39 The
Court's drawing of boundaries between the Patent Act and the general
commercial law allows for the enforcement of restrictions imposed by
the law of contracts that may not be reflected in the Patent Act-in particular, the restriction requiring privity of contract. Hence, the Court
wrote in Motion PicturePatents Co. of the need
to distinguish between the rights which are given to the inventor by
the patent law and which he may assert against all the world through
an infringement proceeding, and rights which he may create for himself by private contract, which, however, are subject to the rules of
general, as distinguished from those of the patent, law. 140
The Court has also used patent exhaustion to prevent patent law
from interfering with antitrust law and policy. In Boston Store of Chicago v. American GraphophoneCo.,1 4 1 the Court held that the patent holder's post-sale restrictions on price were ineffective to prevent patent exhaustion in part because a contrary conclusion would interfere with the
policies of antitrust law:
[T]here can be no doubt that the alleged price-fixing contract disclosed in the certificate was contrary to the general law and void.
There can be equally no doubt that the power to make it in derogation
of the general law was not within the monopoly conferred by the patent law and that the attempt to enforce its apparent obligations under
the guise of a patent infringement was not embraced within the remedies given for the protection of the rights which the patent law conferred. 142

Hence, patent exhaustion occurred because the sale of the patented
machine "placed the machine so sold beyond the confines of the patent
law." 143 And beyond the confines of patent law lies antitrust law, under
which the price restrictions were unenforceable based on the policies of
that body of law.
The Court used patent exhaustion to avoid interference by the Patent Act with the domain of antitrust law again in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States.'" After finding patent exhaustion rendered unenforceable
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post-sale restraints on the price of patented fuel additives, the Court held
that "[s]uch contracts or combinations which are used to obstruct the free
and natural flow in the channels of interstate commerce of trade even in a
patented article, after it is sold by the patentee or his licensee, are a violation of the Sherman Act." 1 45

Hence, patent exhaustion liberates a patented product from regulation under the Patent Act and allows the generally applicable law of contracts and antitrust to govern whether further restraints on the product are
enforceable. This domain theory of patent exhaustion is consistent with
the other two policies of patent exhaustion , not opposed to those theories. By preventing the Patent Act from interfering with general commercial law, patent exhaustion preserves the common law's policy against
servitudes running with personal property. By preventing the duplicative
collection of royalties for the use of patented products, patent exhaustion
allows for the availability of this double recovery to be determined by the
general law of contracts, including the rule requiring privity of contract.
The domain theory of patent exhaustion, like the other theories discussed above, requires exhaustion to adhere in the patented article, and
not to protect only particular classes of defendants. Such an understanding of patent exhaustion has always been central to an articulation of
domain theory. Once a patented article is sold or licensed, "it is no longer
within the limits of the [patent] monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is
no longer under the protection of the act of Congress."l4 6 This passage of
the accused product outside of the domain of the Patent Act is what allows other areas of generally applicable commercial law to govern further use of the article.
IV. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that once a patented
product is sold or licensed, patent rights in that article are exhausted,
such that patent holders cannot pursue the article down the stream of
commerce to obtain double recovery, place further restraints on alienation, or otherwise use the Patent Act to interfere with generally applicable commercial law. In order to effectuate these policies, patent exhaustion must be conceived as adhering in the patented product, and not applying only to protect particular classes of defendants who interact with
the patented product. Patent exhaustion must liberate the patented product, and not just people, so that it may navigate the stream of commerce
free and clear of the patent thicket.
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